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DISSING DISABILITIES:

A STUDENT'S DUTY

To MITIGATE MALADIES
J. J. Knauff
Di Sabled, a law student, requests accommodation under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Di suffers from a
1
minor case of carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) and lazygraphia2-the combination of which make her handwriting almost illegible. Throughout her undergraduate career, Di took
mitigating measures to help keep her up in class. She wore corrective splints to alleviate the symptoms of CTS, and she developed study habits that allowed her to overcome her writing
difficulties. Di took her Law School Aptitude Test (LSAT) without accommodations, scored a 150, and was accepted to Aco
Modate U. School of Law. After her first semester at Aco Modate U., Di scored poorly on her exams and feared that she
might fail out of school. She talked to her dean and presented a
letter from her personal doctor attesting to her disabilities and
requesting the accommodation of extra time on her second semester exams. The dean approved her accommodation, and Di
received an extra two hours per exam. With the extra time, Di
excelled on her tests. In fact, her high second semester scores
raised her cumulative grade-point-average (GPA) to the top
15% of her class, thereby meeting the grade-on requirements of
Aco Modate U. School of Law Law Review. Was the ADA enacted to give average students the opportunity to excel beyond
their aptitude levels? How can schools combat the misuse of the
ADA by students with correctable impairments?

* B.A.S., Texas Tech University; J.D., Texas Wesleyan University. I would like
to thank Professors Stephen Alton, Lynn Rambo and Joe Spurlock II, as well as my
parents, Jerry and Phyllis Knauff.
1. See TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 323 (18" ed. 1997) (stating
carpal tunnel syndrome causes a numbness or pain in the wrist or hand and that resting the wrist, using a splint, and the use of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs can
eliminate the symptoms) [hereinafter TABER'S].
2. Sloppy handwriting (a term coined by the author).
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INTRODUCTION

In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) to level the playing field for the more than forty3
three million Americans with physical or mental disabilities.
The ADA prohibits discrimination by covered entities, including post-graduate schools, from discriminating against quali4
fied disabled individuals.
In the last few years, individuals seeking accommodation
5
for more time on admissions exams has more than doubled.
For example, between 1990 and 1993, the number of learning
disabled individuals taking the LSAT under special conditions
6
increased from 261 to 553. Also, the learning disabled accounted for approximately 60% of the total number of accom7
modated LSAT test takers. Correlatively, law schools' disabled
student accommodations have also increased.
An Association of American Law Schools (AALS) survel
indicated that among the categories of handicapping condi9
tions, learning disabilities contained the largest number of
1
students. ° Further, a 1992 American Council on Education
study revealed that one in eleven college freshmen reported

3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1999) (showing Congress' findings regarding the
disabled and stating Congress' purposes in passing the ADA). See also Timothy Stewart Bland, The Determination of Disability Under The ADA: Should Mitigating Factors
Such As Medications Be Considered?, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 267 (1999) (noting that
Congress was concerned with the unequal treatment of persons with disabilities).
4. See 42 U.S. C. § 12181 (7)(j) (1999) and 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1999).
5. See Lisa Eichorn, Reasonable Accommodations and Awkward Compromises:
Issues Concerning Learning Disabled Students and Professional Schools in the Law
School Context, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 31 (1997).
6. See Linda F. Wightman, Test Takers with Disabilities: A Summary of Data
From Special Administrations of the LSAT, in LAS School Admission Council Research
Report 93-03 (Dec. 1993) at 12 (available from Law Service, Newtown, Pennsylvania).
See also Eichorn, supra note 5, at 31.
7. See Wightman, supra note 6.
8. SeeM. Kay Runyan and Joseph F. Smith, Jr., Identifying and Accommodating
Learning Disabled Law School Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 340 (1991) (noting
that 86.3% of 147 law schools responded to the survey with information about types of
student disabilities, types of accommodations, and guidelines regarding accommodations).
9. See TABER'S, supra note 1, at 560 (defining learning disability as a disorder of
academic functioning that is marked by difficulties in learning that are far greater
than would be expected for the person's age and measured intelligence).
10. See Runyan, supra note 8, at 320 (referring to the 1989-1990 AALS survey of
175 AHA-approved law schools which found that 235 of the 725 identified disabled students were learning disabled).
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having a disability compared with one in thirty-eight in 1978.
This study also showed that disabled enrollment has more than
12
tripled during that same period of time. In addition, learning
disabled adults reportedly are the fastest growing group of col13
lege and university students today. Law school accommodation incidences will likely increase as these university students
graduate and seek post-secondary education. Thus, law schools
should review their learning disability policies to prevent students having medical or physical "disabilities" that can be
14
mitigated without invoking the ADA to acquire special accommodations.
After discussing the statutory background and legislative
history, key terms, and mitigating cases concerning the ADA,
this article will show that the ADA guidelines need to be
changed as they pertain to certain "disabilities" that can be
corrected, including, but not limited to, Attention Deficit Disor5
der (ADD)/
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
17
6
(ADHD)/ Carpal Tunnel Syndrome (CTS), Disorder of Writ20
18
19
ten Expression (DWE), Dysgraphia, and Dyslogia. Next,
11. See Diana C. Pullin and Kevin J. Heaney, The Use of"Flagged" Test Scores in
College and University Admissions: Issues and Implications under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 23 J.C. & U.L. 797 (1997).
12. See Claire E. McCusker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Its Potential for
Expanding the Scope of Reasonable Academic Accommodations, 21 J.C. & U.L. 619, 620
(stating that 2.6% of college freshman reported a disability in 1978, whereas 8.8% of
college freshman reported a disability in 1991).
13. See Pullin, supra note 11, at 797.
14. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that mitigation means "to make [something] less severe"); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
911 (2d ed. 1986) (defining mitigation as making something less severe, less rigorous,
or less painful).
15. See Maria L. Chang, Feeling Blue? Chemicals in Our Brains, and Controversial New Drugs, Can Change Our Moods and Emotions, SCI. WORLD, October 6, 1997,
at 12 (showing that the drug Ritalin is used to treat ADD). See also TABER'S, supra
note 1, at 1205 (stating methylphenidate hydrochloride [Ritalin] is used in treating
ADD).
16. See, e.g., Price v. National Bd. ofMed. Exam'rs, 966 F.Supp. 419, 422 (stating
the essential feature of ADHD is a persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity); TABER'S, supra note 1, at 172-73 (describing ADHD as a disorder
marked by inattention, hyperactivity, and/or impulsivity).
17. See TABER'S, supra note 1, at 323 (defining carpal tunnel syndrome and discussing treatment).
18. See Phyllis G. Coleman et al., Law Students and the Disorder of Written Expression, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1997) (stating that the essential feature of DWE is writing
skills that fall substantially below those expected given the individual's chronological
age, measured intelligence, and age-appropriate education).
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this article will explore the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in
21
McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine
as it relates to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
22
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., Murphy v. United Parcel Ser23
vice, Inc., and New York State Board of Law Examiners v.
24
Bartlett. Finally, this article will propose different remedies
that schools should implement to allow parity between the
learning disabled and non-accommodated students.
II.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Like prior civil rights legislation, the ADA marshals Congressional authority, executive branch agency resources, and
judiciary power to eliminate discrimination against disabled
25
individuals. Furthermore, Congress passed the ADA to give
the disabled "equality of opportunity, full participation, inde26
pendent living, and economic self-sufficiency." The ADA provides sweeping civil rights protection to disabled individuals.
The three major ADA titles apply to employment (Title 1), state
and local public services (Title II), and ~ublic accommodations
2
provided by private entities (Title Ill). Title II's reference to
state public services makes it applicable to public schools, and
Title III's reference to private entities makes it applicable to
private schools.
Three government agencies share the authority to implement the ADA The Supreme Court, in a recent case, defined
this division of authority:

19. Bad handwriting. See e.g., Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down: Why
Johnny Can't Read, Write, or Sit Still, NEW REPUBLIC at 8, August 25, 1997 (describing
dysgraphia as a disorder of written expression); TABER'S, supra note 1, at 587 (likening
dysgraphia to writer's cramp).
20. See TABER'S, supra note 1, at 588 (describing dyslogia as a difficulty in expressing ideas).
21. 170 F.3d 974 (10'" Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1357 (1999).
22. 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999).
23. !d. at 2133.
24. 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998).
25. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1999); Mark D. Laponsky, Dejinin;; "Disability:" A Look at the Term Within the Context of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 39
FED. B. NEWS & J. 44 (1992).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1999).
27. See Laura F. Rothstein, Bar Admissions and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, Hous. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 34, 36 (discussing general issues as related to accommodations on the bar exam).
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
the authority to issue regulations to carry out the employment provisions in Title I of the ADA. .. [t]he Attorney General is granted authority to issue regulations with respect to
Title II, subtitle A, which relates to public services ... [and]
the Secretary of Transportation has authority to issue regulations pertaining to the transportation provisions of Titles II
28
and III.

Previous civil rights legislation extended protection against
discrimination on the basis of readily identifiable characteris29
tics, such as race and sex. Unfortunately, individuals with
30
disabilities, especially those who are learning disabled, are
31
not easily identifiable. Also, although the ADA seems to set
forth a comprehensive scheme for determining if an individual
is disabled, it fails to define the major phrases critical to un32
derstand the nature of an ADA disability.
III. KEY TERMS
Any discussion of the ADA requires an understanding of the
key terminology used in the Act. The threshold issue in every
ADA case is whether the individual bringing the suit is "dis33
abled" within the meaning of the statute. The ADA defines
the term "disability" as, "(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
34
being regarded as having such an impairment." According to
Title II of the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by

28. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2144-45 (1999).
29. Laponsky, supra note 12, at 45.
30. See McCusker, supra note 25, at 621 (stating that learning disabilities are
known as invisible disabilities).
31. See Laponsky, supra note 25, at 45.
32. See Price v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F.Supp. 419, 424 (S.D.W.V.
1997) (stating the ADA does not define the phrases "physical or mental impairment,"
"substantially limits," and "major life activities"). See also Laponsky, supra note 25, at
45 (noting that the meaning of disability is unclear).
33. See 42 U.S. C. § 12112 (1999). See also Bland, supra note 3, at 268 (noting the
threshold issue for bringing an ADA case is being "disabled").
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1999).
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any such entity."

35

A. A Physical or Mental Impairment
When Congress passed the ADA, it neither defined nor
36
enumerated the phrase "a physical or mental impairment."
However, the EEOC issued regulations to provide guidance regarding the proper interpretation of this term. Under the regulations, a "physical impairment" includes
any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin, and endocrine, ... or any mental or psychological disorder, ... emotional or mental illness, and specific learning dis.1. . 37
a b1 1bes.
Unfortunately, the ADA does not define the term "specific
learning disability." However, Congress considered the issue of
learning disabilities when it passed the Individuals with Dis38
abilities Education Act (IDEA). Thus, IDEA offers guidance as
to the general legal boundaries of learning disabilities and
39
should be used to interpret the term. This act states that a
learning disability is "a disorder in one or more of the basic
psychological processes involved in understanding or in using
language, spoken or written, that may manifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do
40
mathematical calculations."
B. Substantially Limits
The term "substantially limits" is ambiguous,

41

but the

35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1999); McGuinness v. University of New Mexico
Sch. ofMed., 170 F.3d 974,978 (lOth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1357 (1999).
36. See, e.g., Price, 966 F.Supp. at 424; Bartlett v. New York Bd. of Law Exam'rs,
156 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated by, 119 S.Ct. 2388 (1999); Kevin H. Smith,
Disabilities, Law Schools, and Law Students: A Proactive and Holistic Approach, 32
AKRON L. REV. 1, 42 (1999).
37. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1999).
38. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(a) (1999). See also Eichhorn, supra note 5, at 40.
39. See Eichorn, supra note 5, at 40.
40. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(10) (2000).
41. See, e.g., Price, 966 F.Supp. at 424 (finding that the ADA does not define the
critical term "substantially limits," and thus it is open to judicial interpretation); Adam
A. Milani, Disabled Students in Higher Education: Administrative and Judicial En·
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regulations promulgated by the EEOC under the ADA provide
significant guidance. The regulations state that "substantially
limits" means "unable to perform a major life activity that the
42
average person in the general population can perform." Also,
the determination of whether an impairment is substantially
limiting accounts for, "(1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) the duration or expected duration of their impairment, and (3) the permanent or long term impact or expected impact or long term impact of or resulting from the
.
.
t ,43
1mpmrmen.
In light of the EEOC guidelines, the Supreme Court held
that the term "substantially limits" should be read "as requiring that a person be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability."44 Furthermore, the Court stated that a person whose
physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or
other measures does not have an impairment that presently
45
"substantially limits" a major life activity. A person with an
impairment who has been corrected by mitigating measures,
such as eyeglasses or medication, still has an impairment;
46
however, the impairment is hypothetical because it does not
presently affect that person, thus she is not to be regarded as
47
being "substantially limited" in a major life activity.

forcement of Disability Law, 22 J.C. & U.L. 989, 989 (1996) (stating that the imprecision of ADA phrases is a source offrustration for both administrators and students).
42. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i) (2000) (defining "substantially limits");
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47; Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.
1997) (holding that an impairment is to be measured against what the average person
does); Gonzalez v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 60 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705 (E. D. Mich.
1999) (finding that average, or even slightly below average, is not disabled for purposes
of the ADA).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.21j)(2) (2000). See also Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d
1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1999).
44. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
45. ld. at 2146-47.
46. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii) (2000); Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146;
Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F. 3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating the ADA requires permanent or long-term impairments); Heintzelman v. Runyon, 120 F.3d 143, 145 (8th Cir.
1997) (finding "temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no
long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities"); Rothstein, supra note 27,
at 36 (stating that individuals with certain emotional problems, such as stress, chronic
lateness, and test phobia often have been treated as not being covered by discrimination statutes because their impairments do not substantially interfere with major life
activities).
47. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
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C. Major Life Activity
The term "major life activity" means "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
48
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Major
49
life activities are to be viewed narrowly. For example, plaintiffs must allege that they are unable to work in a broad class
of jobs when they claim to be limited in the major life activity of
50
working. The EEOC requirements state that "the inability to
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substan51
tial limitation in the major life activity of working." The
EEOC regulation's definition of substantial limitation on
"working" is similar to the deciding principles of employment
discrimination cases. By analogy, the EEOC re¥ulations can
5
apply to ADA claims in the educational context. Therefore, a
student must demonstrate that her learning disability impedes
53
her performance in a wide variety of disciplines.

D. Qualified Individual
Under the ADA, a student with a disability does not automatically qualify for an accommodation on an examination,
special consideration during the admissions process, or accom54
modations in programs or services after admission. Rather, a
student must show that she is a "qualified individual with a
55
disability." Thus, under Title II, a "qualified individual" is
someone with a disability who, with or without reasonable
modification, meets the essential eligibility requirements to re56
ceive public services or participate in a public program. In
other words, a "qualified individual with a disability" is some48. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999).
49. See Sutton, 199 S. Ct. at 2149.
50. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1999) (stating the inability to perform a single,
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working). See also Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151 (holding that if a host of different types of
jobs are available then one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs).
51. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
52. McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 978.
53. See id. See also Betts v. University of Virginia, No. 97-1850, slip op. at 13 (4th
Cir. Sept. 22, 1999) (stating that plaintiff may have a learning disorder that "substantially limits" his ability to attend medical school, but that attending medical school is
not a "major life activity").
54. See Pullin, supra note 11, at 804.
55. Id.
56. McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 978.
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one who meets all program requirements in spite of her handi57
cap.
E. Reasonable Accommodations
A "reasonable accommodation" makes existing facilities
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.58 Title III of the ADA explicitly outlines examples of accommodations that must be given. Reasonable accommodations
include changes in the length of time for completion of the examination and adaptation of the manner in which the exami59
nation is given. Furthermore, Title III requires taped examinations, interpreters, or other effective methods of making
orally delivered material available to individuals with hearing
impairments. For individuals with visual impairments or
learning disabilities, Title III also requires the availability of
Braille or large grint examinations and answer sheets, or
qualified readers. Other accommodations for physical disabilities include wheel chair access, table height adaptations, and
61
extra time for rest breaks.
Title III regulations discuss examinations and provide that
any private entity who offers an examination must ensure that:
The examination is selected and administered so as to best
ensure that, when the examination is administered to an individual with a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or
speaking skills, the examination results accurately reflect the
individual's aptitude or achievement level or whatever other
factor the examination purports to measure, rather than reflecting the individual's impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills (except where those skills are the factors that the
.
.
) 62
exammat10n purports to measure .

57. See Pullin, supra note 11, at 804.
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i) (2000). See also James F. Carr, Effects of the
ADA On Licensing and Regulation of Professionals, 23 COLO. LAW 343 (1994) (discussing the ADA's key terms and the effects of the ADA on professional licensing and regulation).
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii) (2000). See also Deborah Piltch et a!., The Americans With Disabilities Act and Professional Licensing, 17 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 556, 557 (1993) (stating that the ADA was implemented to give the
disabled the ability to compete with the non-disabled).
60. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2000). See also Piltch, supra note 59, at 557.
61. See S. E. Phillips, Testing Condition Accommodations for Disabled Students,
80 EDUC. L. REP. 9, 22 (1993).
62. 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(i) (2000).
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However, an accommodation is not reasonable if it consti63
tutes an undue burden of hardship to provide it, or if it re64
quires a fundamental alteration to the institution's program.
As stated, many of the phrases in the ADA are imprecise or
ill-defined; these vague IJhrases have led to various interpreta65
tions by different courts. However, the Supreme Court has recently given guidance by interpreting the ambiguous phrases
66
and shedding light on the hazy definitions.
IV. MITIGATION CASES
The primary issue concerning students and the ADA is
whether corrective and mitigating measures should be considered in determining a student's disabled status. The Supreme
Court analogized the principles of employment disability to
disabilities in the education setting in New York State Board of
67
Law Examiners v. Bartlett. However, the Court did not discuss the facts of the case. Thus, it is likely that the Tenth Circuit's decision in McGuinness v. University of New Mexico
68
School of Medicine represents how the Supreme Court would
apply their holdings in Sutton and Murphy to disabilities in the
69
educational setting. In both Sutton and Murphy, the Court
63. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 <0 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Application of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 to Colleges and Universities:
An Overview and Discussion of Special Issues Relating to Students, 23 J.C. & U.L. 1,
14-15 (1996).
64. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (2000); Tucker, supra note 63, at 15.
65. See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the ADA provides no protection for individuals whose impairment is fully mitigated); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (lOth Cir. 1997) (finding the
determination of whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life
activity should take into consideration mitigating or corrective measures utilized by
the individual). But see Arnold v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 864 (1st Cir.
1998) (stating a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures); Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 329 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that mitigating
measures should not be taken into account when determining if a person is substantially limited in a major life activity).
66. See, e.g., New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Bartlett, 119 S. Ct. 2388
(1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2136 (1999); Sutton, 119 S.
Ct. at 2139.
67. 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999).
68. 170 F.3d 974, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1357 (1999).
69. See, e.g., Zukle v. University of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th Cir.
1999) (analogizing employment discrimination with discrimination in the school context); McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 978 (holding that the deciding principles of employment
discrimination cases can be applied in the educational context); McPherson v. Michigan
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found that disability in the employment context is gauged by
70
the corrective measures taken by the disabled. Similarly, the
McGuinness Court found that disability in the educational context is measured against the corrective actions taken by the
disabled.
A.

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
71

In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures
that mitigate the individual's impairment, including, in this in72
stance, eyeglasses and contact lenses. The Sutton case involved myopic twin sisters who, without corrective lenses, could
not see to conduct numerous activities such as driving a vehi73
cle, watching television, or shopping in public stores. However, with corrective measures, such as glasses or contact
lenses, both sisters function identically to individuals without a
74
similar impairment. The Court held that if the impairment is
corrected it does not "substantially limit" a major life activity.
The Court proffered several reasons for judging a person's
disability based on their corrected or mitigated state. First, the
Court worried that to view people in their uncorrected or unmitigated state would directly counter the ADA's requirement
that each person be evaluated individually and not as a
75
group. Neither the medical name nor the diagnosis of the impairment should determine whether an individual has a disability; rather, the effect of the impairment on the life of the
individual should be the sole criterion when determining if that
76
individual is disabled. To allow otherwise would cause speculation about a person's condition, which would lead to generali77
zations about an uncorrected impairment. This grouping by
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that the decisional principles of employment discrimination can be applied to ADA cases arising in
education).
70. See, e.g., Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137.
71. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
72. Id. at 2143.
73. ld.
74. ld.
75. ld. at 2147. See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2000) (requiring a
case-by- case analysis to determine if an individual is "substantially limit[ed)").
76. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
77. Id.
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generalization would create a system in which a person would
be treated as a member of a group of people with similar impairments rather than as an individual with a distinct disability. In turn, this grouping by generalizations would contradict
78
the ADA's requirement of individualized inquiry. Further,
broad generalizations would cause speculation about a person's
condition, which would be contrary to both the letter and the
79
spirit of the ADA.
Second, to allow a laundry list of generalized disabilities
could lead to an anomalous result, where negative side effects
suffered by an individual who takes mitigating measures could
80
not be considered. Again, such generalizations go against the
ADA's mandate that the determination of a disability be re81
viewed on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the use of corrective devices does not, in and of itself, relieve a person's disability.82 Rather, the determination depends on whether the
limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are
83
in fact substantially limiting.
Finally, the Court found that viewing a disability in its uncorrected or unmitigated state would be over-inclusive and go
84
against the intent of Congress. Congress found that "some
43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as
85
a whole is growing older." If Congress wanted the ADA to include uncorrected or unmitigated disabilities, it would have incorporated the report from the National Council on Disability.
This report estimated that over 160 million disabled people live
86
in America. This number accounted for all conditions that im87
pair the health or normal functional abilities of an individual.
Included in this number were: 100 million people who need corrective lenses to see properly, 28 million hearing-impaired
Americans, and approximately 50 million people with high
78.
79.
80.
81.
(stating
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

ld.
ld.
ld.
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1998)
that the determination of disability must be made on a case-by-case basis).
Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2149.
ld.
ld. at 2147.
ld.
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
ld. at 2148.
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88

blood pressure. Because Congress did not mention such a high
number of people in passing the statute, it seems evident that
Congress intended to restrict ADA coverage to those whose im89
pairments could not be mitigated by corrective measures.
The Sutton Court determined that the petitioners were not
disabled because with corrective lenses their visual acuity was
20/20. Thus, the Court found that the petitioners functioned
90
identically to individuals without a similar impairment. The
Court held that to be regarded as substantially limited in the
major life activity of working:
one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an
individual's skills ... are available, one is not precluded from a
substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types
of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range
. b 91
0 f JO S.

Thus, the court stated that a person's inability to perform a
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limita92
tion in the major life activity of working. After Sutton, the
Court ruled similarly in the following case where an employer
fired an employee with high blood pressure.

B.

Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
93

In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Supreme
Court held that the decision of whether a person has a disability is made with reference to the mitigating measures em94
ployed by that person. In Murphy, a truck mechanic alleged
that his employer discharged him because of his high blood
95
pressure. In an unmedicated state, Murphy's blood pressure
96
measured approximately 250/160. With medication, however,
Murphy's hypertension did not significantly restrict his activities and, in general, he functioned normally and engaged in ac-

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

!d. at 2149.
!d.
!d.
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
!d. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2000).
119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
!d. at 2137.
!d. at 2136.
!d.
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97
tivities that other persons normally do. Murphy alleged his
hypertension limited him in the major life activities of "run98
ning, eating, exercising, breathing, hearing, and seeing."
In determining whether Murphy was disabled under the
ADA, the Supreme Court held that it must consider his hypertension in a medicated state. The Court found that Murphy
99
was not substantially limited in any major life activity. Citing
its decision in Sutton, the Supreme Court held that Murphy's
high blood pressure did not substantially limit him in any ma100
jor life activity because, when medicated, Murphy "functions
normally doing everyday activity that an everyday person
101
does." The Court also reiterated its holding in Sutton by finding that Murphy was not "substantially limited" in the major
life activity of working because Murphy was only precluded
from being a mechanic in a particular field and was not pre102
cluded from a broad class of jobs. The Court's requirement
that a person be precluded from a broad class of jobs also carries over to the area of education.

C.

Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners

103
In Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners,
the Second Circuit determined that, "disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures."104 In this case, Dr. Marilyn Bartlett alleged that the New
York State Board of Law Examiners (Board) discriminated
against her by not allowing her reasonable bar exam accommodations.105 Dr. Bartlett suffered from a cognitive disorder that
106
impaired her ability to read. Without accommodations, Bart107
lett failed the bar examination on four separate occasions.
Also, after receiving the accommodation of extra time on her

97.
98.
cussing
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F.Supp. 872, 875 (D. Kan. 1996) (distestimony of petitioner's physician as taken from the trial court's record).
Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
ld. at 2139.
Id. at 2137.
ld. at 2139.
156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998).
ld.
ld.
ld. at 324.
Id.
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108

fifth examination she still failed to pass.
Bartlett brought
suit against the Board demanding that she be given reasonable
accommodations (i.e., no time limitation) on the bar examination.Io9

Although she had a history of self-accommodation that allowed her to achieve average reading skills, the Second Circuit
found Bartlett was limited in the major life activitl of reading
11
and learning as compared to the average person. In its finding, the Court determined mitigating measures should not be
considered when determining whether a person is disabled.m
However, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Second
Circuit's holding and remanded the case to be determined in
112
light of its rulings in Sutton and Murphy. Unfortunately, the
Court did not analyze the facts in Bartlett. Nevertheless, in
113
McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine,
the Tenth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's holdings. The
case illustrates how the definition of "substantially limited"
114
applies to ADA claims in an educational setting.

D.

McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of
Medicine

In McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of Medi115
cine, the Tenth Circuit held that impairments that are limited to certain academic subjects are not disabilities under the
116
ADA.
In McGuinness, a first-year medical student was re117
quired to take a course in biochemistry. The student suffered
from anxiety attacks when taking tests related to chemistry or
118
math. The student notified his professor about his anxietx
19
but insisted that he needed no test-taking accommodations.
108. Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 325.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 329.
111. Id.
112. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Bartlett, 119 8. Ct. 2388 (1999) (vacating lower court's holding and remanding the case).
113. 170 F.3d 974 (lOth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 8. Ct. 1357 (1999).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (holding that an anxiety disorder that manifests itself in limited circumstances does not constitute a disability under the ADA).
117. Id. at 976.
118. Id. at 977.
119. Id.
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Unfortunately, the student did not receive a passing grade and
refused to take the required make-up exam. Instead, he filed
suit in federal district court against the University of New
Mexico School of Medicine (UNM), alleging violations of the
120
ADA for failure to reasonably accommodate his test anxiety.
The district court granted summary judgement in favor of
UNM because the student did not prove that he was disabled
121
under the ADA. The student appealed and the Tenth Circuit
122
affirmed the district court's holding.
The Tenth Circuit's holding was similar to those proffered
by the Supreme Court in Sutton and Murphy. The Tenth Circuit held that an anxiety disorder that manifests itself only
during chemistry and mathematics tests is limited and does
123
not constitute a disability under the ADA. That Court found
the ADA's definition of substantial limitations on "working"
should not control the outcome of the case, rather, the Court
posited that the "deciding principles of employment discrimination cases can be applied to ADA claims in the educational context."124 Like the Supreme Court decisions in Sutton and Murphy, the Tenth Circuit held that an individual did not have an
impairment if his disability did not prevent him from performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training,
125
skills, and abilities. By analogy, the student in McGuinness
needed to demonstrate that his anxiety impeded his perform126
ance in a wide variety of disciplines. He did not do this. The
Court held that the student did not meet the threshold for disability because, "[a]n impairment limited to specific stressful
127
situations .. .is not a disability."
The cases of Sutton, Murphy, Bartlett, and McGuinness all
stand for the principle that a person is not "substantially limited" if a disability can be mitigated and if the disability does
not limit a person in a "major life activity." Thus, it is neces-

120. McGuinness, 183 F.3d at 1173 (discussing claim preclusion and the proceedings of the original McGuinness case).
121. ld. at 1174.
122. ld.
123. McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 977.
124. !d. at 978.
125. ld.
126. ld.
127. ld. at 980.
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sary for schools to incorporate these holdings into their policies
toward accommodating the learning disabled.
V.

THE ADA's APPLICATION TO LAW SCHOOLS

Post-graduate schools should set forth policies that preclude
students from claiming an ADA learning disability if such a
disability can be mitigated through medication or other corrective measures. In order to fulfill the ADA's individual inquiry
requirement and to avoid generalizations about the learning
disabled, schools should tailor accommodations to the specific
needs of the learning disabled individual.
The apprehensions that the Supreme Court posited in Sutton are extremely prevalent today. Individuals with grave
physical handicaps comprise only a small portion of the people
128
who claim special privilege under the federal disability laws.
Between 1990 and 1993, the number of non-accommodated
students taking the LSAT steadily declined, whereas the number of students re~uesting accommodations increased by ap9
proximately 19.5%. Further, the American Council on Education reported that the percentage of students with learning
disabilities has grown the fastest, increasing from about 15% to
130
25% of all students with disabilities. Also, the learning disabled law student is a member of the largest growing group of
131
handicapped students in post-secondary education. According
to 1996 EEOC figures, only 14% of the disabled-the deaf,
132
blind, and paraplegic-filed complaints. Additionally, a survey of eighty law schools discovered that accommodation re133
quests were granted 98% of the time. Furthermore, only 41%
of the requests for accommodations came from the traditionally
disabled, whereas 53.6% of the requests were from the learning

128. See Shalit, supra note 19.
129. See Wightman, supra note 6, at 12 (showing that from 1990 to 1993 the number of non-accommodated test takers decreased approximately 4.35% while the number
of accommodated test takers increased approximately 19.5%).
130. See McCusker, supra note 12, at 622.
131. See Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, L.D. Law: The Learning Disabled Law Student as Part of a Diverse Law School Environment, 22 S.U. L. REN. 69, 72 (stating it is
estimated that 6% of the law school population isJearning disabled).
132. See Shalit, supra note 19.
133. See Donald Stone, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Legal
Education and Academic Modifications for Disabled Law Students: An Empirical
Study, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 567, 569 (1996).
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134
disabled. Of these requests, 82% of the schools allowed learning disabled students time-and-a-half to double time on exams.135 The only proof that the learning disabled were required
136
to provide for accommodations were recent letters
from a
family doctor, a psychologist, a psychiatrist, an independent
examiner, or a school examiner, stating the student's disability
137
and the accommodations requested.

VI. PROPOSED REMEDIES
Many law students spend hundreds, if not thousands, of
dollars preparing for the LSAT, the first year oflaw school, and
the bar exam. If a student is willing to expend such resources
on getting into school, passing classes, and passing the bar,
what stops a student from using the ADA as a further supplement to succeed? Schools can prevent students from using the
ADA as a learning supplement by incorporating measures such
as flagging of scores, professorial input, and independent testing into their ADA policies so that the potential for abuse will
be virtually eliminated.

A.

Flagging Scores

Students who receive extra time on their examinations
should have a notation put on their transcripts indicating that
the examination was taken with accommodations. In a world
where honors organizations (i.e., Law Review, Moot Court,
Honors Fraternity, etc.) and GPA can be the difference between
working for the best firms and being self-employed, it is necessary that students with correctable maladies have a disincentive to use the ADA as a tool for advancement.
Law Services, the agency that administers the LSAT, regularly grants accommodations, usually in the form of extra time,
138
to learning disabled takers of the LSAT. Although they allow
learning disabled students the accommodation of extra time,
134. ld. (finding that only 25 of 1145 student requests for reasonable accommodations were denied).
135. !d. at 598.
136. !d. at 600 (stating that "recent" meant three years on average).
137. !d.
138. See, e.g., Wightman, supra note 6, at 43; Eichhorn, supra note 5, at 46; LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, 1999-2000 LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRATION AND
INFORMATION BOOK 5 (1999).
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Law Services advises candidates that scores will be flagged.
In particular, Law Services advises candidates:

103
139

[I]f you receive additional test time as an accommodation for
your disability, we [Law Services] will send a statement with
your LSDAS Law School Reports advising that your score(s)
should be interpreted with great sensitivity and flexibility.
Scores earned with additional test time are reported individually and will not be averaged with standard-time scores
or other nonstandard-time scores. Percentile ranks of nonstandard-time scores are not available and will not be re140
ported.

The reason Law Services flags the scores of those who receive extra time is to inform admitting schools that the accommodated LSAT score cannot be relied upon to provide indica141
tions of first-year performance in law school.
A 1993 study by Law Services showed a tendency toward
over-prediction of law school success for learning disabled
LSAT-takers who had received testing accommodations because the speeded nature of the LSAT may give accommodated
test takers a several point advantage over non-accommodated
142
test takers.
This advantage can be seen when comparing test
scores of the accommodated against those of the nonaccommodated. For example, 30% of learning disabled test takers earned LSAT scores of 160 or higher, whereas 18% of the
143
non-accommodated test takers scored 160 or higher. Further,
the accommodated student had an average LSAT score of 154
versus the non-accommodated student who averaged a 150 on
144
145
the LSAT. Dr. Warren Willingham, a psychometrician with

139. See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, 1999-2000 LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRATION AND INFORMATION BOOK 6 (1999). But see Pullin, supra note 11, at 816 (stating

that the use of flagged scores by the testing industry may be a tenuous professional
practice).
140. See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, 1999-2000 LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRATION AND INFORMATION BOOK 6 (1999).
141. See, e.g., Wightman, supra note 6, at 52; Eichorn, supra note 5, at 49; Pullin,
supra note 11, at 826 (arguing that the testing industry uses flags because of its inabil-

ity to demonstrate the validity and accuracy of test scores for all the different types of
accommodations offered to students with disabilities).
142. See Wightman, supra note 6, at 44-45, 52. But see Eichhorn, supra note 5, at
47 (stating that the validity of the study has been called into question because it failed
to track whether the test takers later received accommodations in law school).
143. See Wightman, supra note 6, at 21.
144. !d. at 20.
145. See TABER'S, supra note 1, at 1592 (stating a psychometrician is a person who
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the Educational Testing Service, found similar results when
146
comparing Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT)
scores of the
learning disabled and the non-learning disabled. Dr. Willingham's study found the college grades of learning disabled students were substantially over-predicted when these students
were allowed to take the SAT in an untimed or extended-time
147
basis.
Another study undertaken jointly by the College
Board, Education Testing Services (ETS), and the Graduate
148
Record Examination Board (GRE) found the same results.
This four-year study of the SAT and GRE tests found clear evidence that future educational performance was over-~redicted
49
for students who received extra time on their tests.
These
studies suggest that, "providing longer amounts of time may
raise scores beyond the level appropriate to compensate for the
. b'l't
,150
1 1 y.
d 1sa
In light of these findings, schools should flag transcripts
and tests of those students who receive extra time on their exams to inform honors organizations that the student did not
participate in the traditional end-of-semester timed examination.151 Like the LSAT guidelines, such a system would allow
honors organizations the ability to interpret the scores with
sensitivity and flexibility toward the learning disabled. However, no organization should use the information to deny membership to a disabled student because such use of the information would be discriminatory and would violate the ADA
gm'd e1'mes. 152
is skilled in psychometry which is the measurement of psychological variables, such as
intelligence, aptitude, behavior, and emotional variables). See also Michael K. McKinney, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on the Bar Examination Process:
The Applicability of Title II and Title III to the Learning Disabled, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
669, 682-83 (1995-1996) (stating that psychometricians believe that permitting additional amounts of time on exams could alter the construct and predictive validity of the
test).
146. See Shalit, supra note 19 (noting the SAT is a standardized test that estimates how well a particular applicant will perform in college).
147. Id. See also Phillips, supra note 61, at 10.
148. See Pullin, supra note 11, at 817.
149. Id.
150. See Phillips, supra note 61, at 10.
151. Univ. of Michigan, 2 NAT'L DISAB. L. REP. 302 (Oct. 18, 1991) (stating the
mere fact that a school has notice that a student's test scores were achieved under nonstandard conditions is not discriminatory).
152. See State Univ. of N.Y. Health Science Ctr. at Brooklyn-College of Medicine
(NY), 5 NAT'L DISABILITY L. REP. 77 (Aug. 18, 1993) (holding that universities may not
devalue scores of individuals who take the MCAT under non-standard conditions). See
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Schools should allow professors the opportunity to incorporate a balancing test when grading accommodated scores
against non-accommodated scores. After grading all the tests
together, the professor should be informed which exams were
accommodated and the professor should be given the opportunity to compare the different works. If the accommodated test
is on par with those scores of the non-accommodated exams
then the grade should stand without a flag. However, if it
would be unfair to compare the accommodated tests with the
examinations of those who participated in the stressful, time
constrained group then the transcript should be flagged. To determine whether a grade should be flagged, the professor
should consider some of the following questions:
1) Will the test score of the accommodated student have a different interpretation from that of other students tested without the accommodations? Are the scores comparable?
2) Are the format of the test questions or the conditions being
altered a part of the skill or knowledge being tested?
3) Would allowing the accommodations for all students help
them achieve higher scores and alter the inference made from
their test scores?
4) Can valid and reliable procedures and appeals be established for determining which students will be given the requested accommodation?
5) Should the disabled student be given any responsibility for
153
adaptation to existing testing conditions?

Accommodated students with flagged transcripts should be
required to write-on, rather than grade-on to organizations
that require a minimum GPA, such as Law Review. To be fair,
the write-on requirements would take into account the student's disability, thereby allowing the student the same accommodations that were received on the examination. This
would further the ADA's goal of placing those with disabilities
on an equal footing with those who are not disabled, instead of

also Milani, supra note 41, at 998 (showing that universities violate the ADA when
they place lower weight on standardized test scores achieved under conditions designed
to accommodate disabilities). But see Pullin, supra note 11, at 824 (stating that the
practice of flagging may unfairly stigmatize disabled students).
153. Phillips, supra note 61, at 27. See also McKinney, supra note 145, at 684.

106

[2001

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL
154

This
giVmg the learning disabled advantages over others.
balancing test is equitable, not punitive, since it would meet
the ADA requirement of individual inquiry by being implemented on an exam-by-exam basis, thereby rejecting blanket
policies and eliminating generalizations about those with
learning disabilities. Also, the balancing test would allow those
students who truly are learning disabled to get the help they
need without being stigmatized for receiving assistance. Furthermore, the professor's comparison of examinations would
not jeopardize the hallowed anonymous grading system of most
schools, since the professor would only be informed that the
exam was accommodated and not who the accommodated student was. Thus, flagging of scores would lead to parity and
fairness since students would be less inclined to claim suspect
disabilities.

B.

Professorial Input

Law school is an environment where professors teach and
construct exams geared toward providing students with the
tools necessary for the practice of law. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that professors be allowed to voice an opinion as to the kinds of accommodations provided to learning disabled students. Unfortunately, the majority of law schools do
not consult professors for input into the types of accommodations that should be given to students with learning disabili155
ties. In fact, a survey of eighty law schools showed that 69%
156
of the time professors have no input about accommodations.
Compared to professional diagnosticians, the law faculty
may lack the training and expertise for determining the extent
of a person's disability. However, professors are qualified to determine the reasonable accommodations that should be pro157
vided to ensure fair and equitable treatment. Traditionally, a
law student's grade depends almost entirely on one examina-

154. D'Amico v. New York Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 813 F.Supp. 217, 221 (W.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that plaintiffs serious visual disability required a reasonable accommodation and that such accommodation would not be an unfair advantage because it
would allow plaintiff to read at a normal rate).
155. See Stone, supra note 133, at 598.
156. Id. (showing that, when it comes to accommodations, professors make the final decision in 3% of cases, get consulted in 28% of cases, and have no input in 69% of
cases).
157. Id. at 576.
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tion where the student exhibits the qualities thought to be im158
portant to succeed in the legal profession. The professor is
best situated to evaluate and establish the methods (i.e., case
study, problems, hypotheticals, etc.) most suited to developing
the knowledge and skills that the professor feels must be acquired by the student, both for the Rurpose of the course and
1 9
for the purpose of practicing law . By logical inference, it
would seem that the facilitator of knowledge and the creator of
the exam would also be one of the best resources for ascertaining what accommodations could be implemented without devaluing the course objectives. Furthermore, input from professors would not threaten the anonymity of students because the
professor would only give insight into how different accommodations could affect the curriculum; therefore, the professor
would have no first-hand knowledge of who the accommodated
student is. Since they provide students with the knowledge and
experience needed for practice, the law faculty should be consulted for input on the appropriateness of accommodations as
they pertain to exams. Also, professorial input would not be
violative of the ADA's guidelines since the consultation would
be done generally and anonymously.

C.

Independent Testing

To ensure uniformity and fairness and to prevent students
160
from shopping for favorable evaluators of disabilities, schools
should require disabled students to submit to schooladministered psychological or medical examinations to document any disabilities. If a school-administered examination is
cost-prohibitive then schools should require independent testing to document disabilities.
Currently, the majority of law schools require some form of
documentation from the student's own psychologist, psychia161
trist, or doctor.
On average, the documentation must have
been obtained within the last three years and it must request
162
specific accommodations. There are a great variety of people
who have taken on the role of diagnostician, and these diagnos-

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Eichhorn, supra note 5, at 57.
See Smith, supra note 36, at 72-73.
See Stone, supra note 133, at 576.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 578.
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ticians use a wide variety of definitions, testing techniques, and
163
reporting methods.
Thus, schools should refer students to
school administered psychological or medical examinations to
prevent biased results and to establish uniform criteria that
are based on specific, identified tests. Rarely, if ever, should a
student's hand-picked evaluator be the sole judge for granting
accommodations since some students may shop for favorable
164
evaluations,
and because "some diagnosticians may, consciously or unconsciously, skew their testing in order to achieve
165
particular results." Further, schools should refrain from having blanket policies dictating particular accommodations for
any individuals with particular disabilities (i.e., where disabil166
ity "X" is given accommodation "Y'').
Since blanket policies
167
violate the ADA's requirement of individual inquiry, schools
should do an individualized assessment to determine if an examinee with a learning disability needs an accommodation,
and if so, which accommodation(s) would best meet the indi168
vidual's needs.
For determining independent testing guidelines, schools
could look to the criteria set forth by the Texas Board of Law
Examiners (TBLE). The TBLE provides non-standard testing
accommodations to those individuals who have a permanent
169
disability which substantially limits a major life activity.
Further, the TBLE requires a comprehensive psychoeducational or neuro-psychological assessment that demonstrates the impact of the impairment of an examinee's ability to
163. See Eichorn, supra note 5, at 36 (quoting Dean Arthur Frakt of Widener University School of Law, who reported seeing declines of 20%-25% in I.Q. scores when a
student was tested by a privately retained diagnostician and then by a neutral or disinterested professional). See also Phillips, supra note 61, at 22 (showing that whether a
student is classified as learning disabled depends to a large extent on the method used
to identifY the disability and that the term learning disability has become a catchall
category that makes it difficult to differentiate the learning disabled from students who
are merely low achievers).
164. See Rothstein, supra note 27, at 39 (stating that some admissions professionals are concerned that everyone can find someone who will verify the existence of a
learning disability).
165. See Eichorn, supra note 5, at 36.
166. See Piltch, supra note 59, at 557.
167. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1998) (requiring analysis of disability on a case-by-case basis); Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147 (determining that individual
inquiry is required where disabilities are concerned).
168. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
169. TEXAS BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of
Texas, at 33 (Dec. 21, 1998).
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perform on all testing components of the Texas exam under
170
standard time conditions. Also, the independent documentation must include both diagnostic information and an explanation of the current manifestations or functional limitations of
171
the condition. The assessment should be thorough enough to
demonstrate whether or not a major life activity is substantially limited (i.e., the extent, duration, and impact of the condition).172 Whether a law school uses an in-house evaluator or
an independent evaluator, the school should always take into
account a student's history of testing accommodation and any
mitigating factors that may have effectuated a change in a student's disability classification. By using independent tests and
reviewing a student's history of accommodation, schools can set
standards that are applicable to the learning disabled and in
line with the mandate of the ADA. Also, the use of independent
testing would allow schools to tailor accommodations to the
specific needs of the student, thereby meeting the ADA's requirement of individual inquiry.

VII. CONCLUSION
The ADA is not designed "to allow individuals to advance to
professional positions through a back door. Rather, it is aimed
at rebuilding the threshold of a profession's front door so that
capable people with unrelated disabilities are not barred ...
173
from entering." Unfortunately, schools are allowing people to
advance through the proverbial back door by granting accommodations to those whose conditions can be mitigated or corrected. Therefore, it is of great import for law schools to review
their policies toward the learning disabled. In light of the Supreme Court's holdings in Sutton, Murphy and Bartlett, students who have medical or physical "disabilities" that can be
mitigated should not be allowed to invoke the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) to acquire special accommodations. Furthermore, if a student does invoke the ADA, she should be required to call upon an independent testing center to verify the
disability, her scores should be subject to flagging, and her

170.
171.
172.
173.

!d. at 34.
!d.
!d. at 35.
Price, 966 F. Supp. at 421-22.
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scores should be subject to professorial review. If schools would
implement such remedies, stories like those of Di Sabled could
be averted, and the prejudices and stereotypes about the disabled will be assuaged.

